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ABSTRACT
In this article, we propose a new variable in the formation of individual attitudes towards govern-
mental responsibilities to the unemployed – the perceived magnitude of unemployment. Our choice 
is based on the argument that people’s reactions are strongly influenced by subjective meanings 
ascribed to social realities. We apply a multilevel analysis approach and mainly use the European 
Social Survey (2008). Results show that the perceived magnitude of unemployment positively inf-
luences public attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed, when corrected 
for a series of relevant individual and national characteristics. Moreover, of all tested measures of 
actual unemployment rates, only the long-term unemployment rate has a significant effect on atti-
tudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. Interestingly, this effect is negative, 
which raises questions about how the social realities of unemployment translate into perceptions of 
unemployment.
INTRODUCTION
During the past decades, the European politics of welfare state retrenchment have prompted 
discussions about welfare state recalibration and the extent to which governments should 
exercise their welfare responsibilities (Hemerijck 2012). Moreover, uncurbed unemployment 
rates in Europe have stimulated debates about the ways states should cope with this problem. 
One way to find a “golden mean” for the extent to which governments should provide welfare 
provisions is to consult the public at large. According to Schumpeter (1994, p.12), “attitudes 
are coins that do not readily melt.” So, it could be stated that society has an established 
opinion, which should be taken into account when governments design welfare policies. 
That is, public perceptions may indicate how much social legitimacy the welfare state has in 
supporting needy groups. In the case of unemployment, an analysis of public perceptions is 
highly relevant; 36% of European respondents pointed to unemployment as the main national 
concern (Eurobarometer 2007). Forty per cent of the same Eurobarometer respondents 
indicated that unemployment is also the main worry for the next generation. 
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It is particularly interesting to analyse public attitudes towards welfare provisions for 
the unemployed. Due to comparatively high unemployment rates in recent decades, the 
unemployed are one of the neediest groups in Europe, being highly dependent on social 
provisions. However, despite being very needy, society sees the unemployed as one of the 
least deserving groups in need, with only immigrants perceived as less deserving than the 
unemployed (van Oorschot 2006). This mismatch-situation stimulates thoughts on the key 
determinants influencing public attitudes towards welfare support for the unemployed in 
European countries.  
A solid number of studies have already been dedicated to analysing public support for the 
welfare state in general, as well as attitudes towards welfare provisions for the unemployed. 
They have mainly been based on the idea that preferences for governmental intervention 
are influenced by individual interests, ideological dispositions and values, and institutional 
arrangements (for a general review, see Gevers et al. 2000). However, a considerable share of 
inter-individual and inter-country variation in public support for these government provisions 
remains unexplained (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012a). This unexplained variation 
encourages research with a focus on identifying individual and contextual characteristics and 
mechanisms that contribute to a better understanding of public support for governmental 
efforts to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. 
It is possible to find analyses of whether this public support is influenced by contextual 
determinants, such as a country’s actual unemployment rate (Fraile and Ferrer 2005). However, 
there has been no research that analyses the role the perceived magnitude of unemployment 
plays in the formation of public support for such welfare provisions. An argument for this 
contribution is based on the idea that people’s reactions to a situation are influenced by their 
subjective perceptions (rather than macro-level situations directly). It gives grounds to further 
investigate whether public support for welfare provisions for the unemployed is higher or 
lower when the perceived magnitude of unemployment is larger. 
To summarise, our key research question is: Whether and how is the perceived magnitude 
of unemployment associated to the public attitudes towards governmental responsibilities 
to the unemployed? Does this relationship hold after controlling for potential confounding 
factors?
1. CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING PEOPLE’S AT TITUDES TOWARDS  
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE UNEMPLOYED 
1 . 1 .  R a t i o n a l i t y,  va l u e s  a n d  b e l i e f s :  i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  e x p l a n a t i o n s
T h e  p e r ce i v e d  m a g n i t u d e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t :  f o r g o t t e n  t h o u g h  i m p o r t a n t ? 
According to Thomas and Thomas (1929, p.572), people’s reactions are affected not only by 
social realities, but are also strongly influenced by the meanings ascribed to those situations: 
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” In the context of our 
research, this suggests that the perceived magnitude of unemployment might contribute to 
the formation of people’s attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. 
In addition, people’s understanding of reality passes through filters such as personal 
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observation, communication with others, media (Saunders 2002) or policy makers. Thus, 
people might perceive the magnitude of unemployment to be larger or smaller than it is in 
reality, depending on how these filters work. It is quite often the case that perceptions of 
social reality are erroneous (Eveland and Glynn 2008; Kunovich 2013), which in this context, 
would mean that there is a mismatch between actual and perceived unemployment rates. 
To strengthen our argument that there is a rationale for looking at the perceived magnitude 
of unemployment and its effect on attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the 
unemployed,  we use as a reference, literature illustrating that people’s perceptions of 
certain actual macro-conditions in their country had an effect on their attitudes, beliefs, or 
behaviours. For example, Kunovich (2013) concluded that misperceptions of unemployment 
led to changes in political and economic attitudes, while actual rates of unemployment were 
not directly related to changes in people’s attitudes. Moreover, other authors found that 
the perceived economic performance of the country has an effect on people’s democratic 
attitudes (Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler 2008). In addition, there are effects found 
of perceived corruption in people’s support for democratic ideals (Chang and Kerr 2009) and 
in people’s trust in institutions as well as attitudes towards gift giving (Melgar, Rossi and Smith 
2010). Finally, Allgood and Walstad (2009) reported the effects of perceived financial literacy 
on financial behaviour.  
Two competing explanations of how subjective estimations of the magnitude of 
unemployment contribute to attitudes towards welfare provisions for the unemployed (see 
also van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012a) could be developed. That is, when people perceive a 
large magnitude of unemployment, they might be either less supportive or more supportive of 
the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed. Expectations for a negative relation are 
based on the idea that people might associate unemployment with a burden, i.e. high costs 
and taxes resulting in a reduced household income. The expectations for a positive relation are 
based on the idea that some people might become more empathetic towards the unemployed 
when they associate perceptions of high unemployment with an increase in their personal 
risk of becoming unemployed themselves.  During times that are perceived to be generally 
harsh, this personal association weakens the social stigma attached to the unemployed. These 
competing expectations are advantageous because they reduce the risk of confirmation bias 
and take different theoretical explanations into account (Pleggenkuhle-Miles and Peng 2009). 
We developed these two competing explanations using literature on the effects of the actual 
unemployment rates, which does not really distinguish between actual social realities and 
their perceptions (they are assumed to be the same). However, our position is that these 
are not necessarily the same, and thus we support an observation made by Kunovich (2013): 
“A great deal of social research examines macro-micro linkages—for example, by examining 
how economic conditions influence people’s political attitudes and behavior. Rarely, however, 
do researchers directly examine the mechanisms linking macro-level conditions to individual-
level attitudes and behavior, the accuracy of people’s perceptions of the larger context, or the 
consequences of their misperceptions <...> Misperceptions of unemployment, moreover, lead 
to changes in people’s economic and political attitudes.”
30  Greta Mackonytė, Catalina Lomos and Wim van Oorschot
A central aim of this paper is to determine whether a positive or negative relationship exists 
between the perceived magnitude of unemployment and attitudes towards welfare provisions 
for the unemployed; and whether this relationship holds after controlling for individual and 
country level characteristics that might make the relationship (partially) spurious. In order to 
do so, the next step is to grasp which individual- and context-level characteristics could be 
confounding factors. For this reason, we should study those determinants that potentially 
influence both the perceived magnitude of unemployment and people’s attitudes towards 
welfare for the unemployed. As the characteristics affecting the perceived magnitude of 
unemployment have not been previously analysed in the literature, in the following sections 
we review only those characteristics that were found to influence individual attitudes towards 
governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. 
I n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  e x i s t i n g  l i t e ra t u r e
Literature suggests that public attitudes towards their government’s responsibilities to the 
unemployed might be influenced by values and beliefs, and self-interest (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 
1989; Taylor-Gooby 2004). The self-interest argument states that welfare attitudes depend 
on an individual’s personal stake in welfare provisions. Such stakes relate to different social 
positions, the most notable of which are: 1) (potential) beneficiary, 2) resource competitor, 
3) tax payer, and 4) welfare producer (Goul Andersen et al. 1999; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995). 
As for values and beliefs, they are grouped into: 1) political ideology, 2) political trust, and 
3) attitudes towards the unemployed. 
From the (potential) beneficiary’s perspective, individuals with a higher risk of experiencing 
unemployment, are more sympathetic towards the unemployed (Fraile and Ferrer 2005). 
Empirical evidence shows that those with a higher risk of experiencing unemployment 
are usually women, younger and older people, immigrants, those with lower educational 
levels, and those from ethnic minority backgrounds (Fraile and Ferrer 2005; Svallfors 1997; 
van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013). It is expected that due to higher self-interest, these 
vulnerable groups will have more positive attitudes towards their government’s provisions for 
the unemployed. Additionally, objective unemployment risk might be mediated by perceived 
unemployment risk (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013): a higher objective risk of being 
unemployed leaves people more uncertain about their own employment security and, as a 
result, more sympathetic towards the unemployed. The labour market position of individuals 
and their family members might also matter: the unemployed and their relatives will also 
be more supportive of government efforts to aid the unemployed (Andress and Heien 2001; 
van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013). A similar effect should also apply among the previously 
unemployed: they should also have more positive attitudes towards the welfare state’s 
responsibilities to the unemployed. According to the Eurobarometer (2007), the unemployed 
is the group most concerned about unemployment (57%), a figure that further supports the 
idea that this group might be more sympathetic to the jobless. 
Resource competitors, people receiving other types of social benefits (e.g. retirement 
and disability benefits), might be less supportive of a government’s responsibilities to the 
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unemployed than those receiving unemployment benefits. This is expected due to the fact 
that welfare resources are scarce: the increased expenditure on one type of social benefit may 
reduce expenditure on other benefits (Jeene et al. 2011). Therefore, needy groups may compete 
for social benefits. In broader terms, this approach is based on the realistic group conflict theory 
(Campbell 1965). As all groups would prefer to be ‘haves’ rather than ‘have-nots’, they strive to 
obtain scarce resources by preventing their competitors from getting them (Forsyth 2009). In 
addition, two extensions to this perspective are proposed. First, resource competition should be 
especially visible when other social benefits are the main source of household income. Second, 
the resource competitor’s negative view of governmental responsibilities to the unemployed 
might “transmit” to other household members – despite their own employment status, they 
might be affected by their general household financial situation.
From the tax payer’s perspective, those with higher incomes may be less willing to 
pay more taxes, and therefore, their support for the government’s responsibilities to the 
unemployed could be weaker (Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995). A possible explanation for this might 
be that people with higher income also have a lower risk of becoming unemployed, as they 
are likely to have higher levels of education.
Finally, welfare producers, people employed in the public sector, are expected to be more 
positive towards government provisions in general (Hoel and Knutsen 1989; Svallfors 1997, 
2004). For public sector employees, a generous welfare state implies a larger public sector, 
which means more jobs, increased career possibilities, and more opportunities to receive 
economic benefits. Thus, welfare producers are expected to have positive attitudes towards 
the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed.
Regarding values and beliefs, welfare attitudes are rooted in broader value systems 
(Blekesaune 2007). Here political ideology plays a role: people with a left-wing stance and 
beliefs rooted in egalitarian values are more supportive of welfare programs in general, 
and especially of targeted schemes (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Edlund 2006; Sihvo 
and Uusitalo 1995) such as unemployment benefits. Moreover, citizens’ attitudes towards 
the extent of a government’s responsibilities might depend on their level of political trust. 
According to Hetherington (2004), people are more likely to support the welfare delivery 
system if they also deem it to be trustworthy. Furthermore, Hetherington argues that 
political trust becomes a more prominent factor when governments seek public support 
for redistributive spending that entails widely distributed costs and narrowly concentrated 
benefits, such as spending on unemployment benefits, than when governments seek public 
support for distributive spending with widely distributed costs and benefits. 
Continuing with attitudes towards the unemployed, those with a strong conviction that the 
unemployed are personally responsible for their situation because they simply avoid working, 
might be less supportive of generous state intervention (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013). 
Moreover, welfare support attitudes might be affected by the perceived living standards of 
the unemployed. According to van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012a), people will be more 
supportive when they see a clear need to improve poor living standards of unemployed people. 
Yet, if people believe that welfare support adequately ensures reasonable living standards for 
the unemployed, they will be less supportive of such governmental responsibilities. 
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1 . 2 .  T h e  r o l e  o f  n a t i o n a l  c o n t e x t s
Ac t u a l  u n e m p l o y m e n t  ra t e s
Previous research has often focused on actual unemployment rates as a contextual 
determinant of individual attitudes towards welfare provisions for the unemployed. The 
empirical findings suggest that the effects of the actual unemployment rate are ambiguous: 
there are justifications for both positive and negative effects on public support for the 
unemployed. 
A positive relationship may be expected during times of higher unemployment, as people 
are more worried about becoming unemployed themselves or are concerned about their 
family members experiencing redundancy (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Larsen 2006). A 
positive relationship may also be expected when unemployment is generally high in the whole 
country (Eardley and Matheson 1999; Gallie and Paugam 2002) and society is less likely to 
consider the unemployed as being personally responsible for their situation. However, there 
are also arguments for expecting negative effects of a high unemployment rate on public 
attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. According to Galbraith 
(1992), a high unemployment rate signals higher costs and an increased tax burden. In the 
harsh economic times that coincide with high unemployment, people are less willing to share 
with others due to their own reduced household income (Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995). Finally, in 
such situations, policy makers and the media contribute to attitudes towards and perceptions 
of the unemployed by keeping people informed of necessary cutbacks (Sihvo and Uusitalo 
1995). As a result, during economic downturns and related periods of high unemployment, 
people can become more reluctant to support needy groups. 
Fraile and Ferrer (2005) suggest also paying attention to the salience and persistency of 
unemployment; these features are expected to inform consciousness of unemployment’s 
magnitude. Salient and persistent unemployment can stimulate feelings of economic and 
employment vulnerability and may also lessen the stigma associated with unemployment, 
making people more sociotropic, regardless of whether or not they are employed. This 
insight encourages analyses of a country’s average unemployment rate over the last several 
years (calculated from the annual unemployment rates) to illustrate the persistency of 
unemployment. More broadly, this topic belongs to the discussion on lagged effects. According 
to Norpoth and Yantek (1983, p.786), “[e]conomic conditions whose effects on public opinion 
persist over a long time call for a different response than those whose effects are quickly 
forgotten.” Additionally, we take long-term unemployment rates into account to illustrate the 
salience of unemployment (i.e. length of the unemployment trap). 
O t h e r  co n t e x t u a l  d e t e r m i n a n t s 
As individuals do not live in a vacuum, the general environment created by the country in 
which they reside, such as its social welfare system and economy, might also influence their 
attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. First, attitudes towards 
the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed might be affected by the social welfare 
system of their country.  These systems can be represented by: total social expenditure, (van 
Oorschot et al. 2012; Svallfors 2004) social expenditure on unemployment, generosity of 
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unemployment benefits (Fraile and Ferrer 2005; Fridberg and Ploug 2000), and specificities of 
the unemployment benefit systems (Larsen 2005; Eardley and Matheson 1999; van Oorschot 
and Meuleman 2013). More precisely, social expenditure size may have opposing effects on 
individuals’ attitudes towards welfare support for the unemployed. A positive effect might be 
expected in welfare states with higher levels of spending that promote their social legitimacy 
(van Oorschot et al. 2012). There, people might be convinced that governments should play 
a role in supporting the unemployed.  However, a negative effect might also be expected 
(Svallfors 2004) in countries with lower unemployment expenditures.  In these countries, 
people might have more positive attitudes towards the government’s responsibilities to the 
unemployed as they might think that the currently unemployed receive too little resources 
and, therefore, should be given more support. Regarding the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, Fraile and Ferrer (2005) expect to find stronger support for less spending on 
unemployment protection when a country’s unemployment benefits become more generous 
(i.e. higher replacement rates). This happens because “generosity of social transfers implies a 
higher degree of taxes, and hence a lack of enthusiasm from employed citizens towards paying 
taxes in order to finance unemployment benefits” (Fraile and Ferrer 2005, p.464). Regarding 
the specificities of unemployment benefit systems, Eardley and Matheson (1999) state that in 
means-tested and tax funded systems, the unemployed are more stigmatised due to the fact 
that this kind of system heightens confrontations between beneficiaries and tax payers, when 
compared to systems based on insurance principle and related contributions. Therefore, it is 
expected that the former system would generate negative effects on public attitudes towards 
the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed. 
Second, attitudes towards the government’s provisions for the unemployed might depend 
on such economic factors as GDP per capita and real GDP growth (Blekesaune 2007; van 
Oorschot and Meuleman 2012a; van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013). The economic situation 
of a country might affect people‘s attitudes in opposite directions.  For example, an economic 
downturn may either strengthen solidarity or foster reluctance to support the unemployed 
by paying taxes during difficult economic times (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012a). 
Moreover, measures of income distribution inequality are also included. Van Oorschot and 
Meuleman (2012a) found that people have more positive attitudes towards the government’s 
responsibilities to the unemployed in countries with higher income quintile share ratios (S80/
S20) is higher, i.e. where the total income is more unequally distributed between the 20% of 
the population with the highest income (top quintile) and the 20% of the population with the 
lowest income (bottom quintile).
2. DATA MANAGEMENT AND METHODOLOGY
2 . 1 .  D a t a
Individual data used is derived from the European Social Survey (ESS 2008)1. This survey round 
is especially relevant as it has a special module for welfare attitudes. Our study focuses on 
1  Obtained from face-to-face interviews with people 15 years-old and older, who were selected by random 
probability sampling. Requiring a response rate of at least 70% ensures data reliability.
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23 European countries: Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), the Czech Republic 
(CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), the 
United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Latvia (LV), the Netherlands 
(NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI) 
and Slovakia (SK). Unfortunately, comparable contextual data was not available for Croatia, 
Cyprus, or Ukraine. Lithuania did not have available design weight. The Austrian fieldwork 
period was completely out-of-sync with the other countries. Therefore, we could not include 
these five countries into our analyses. Contextual data was collected from Eurostat, the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) and the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund).
2 . 2 .  Va r i a b l e s
D e p e n d e n t  va r i a b l e
Attitudes towards the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed are measured by 
the question: “How much responsibility do you think governments should have to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?” The response rubric was a scale from 0 
to 10, where 0 indicated that ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed 
“should not be governments’ responsibility at all,” and 10 indicated that it “should be entirely 
governments’ responsibility.” Evidence from previous research suggests that this measure 
is equivalent to and adequate for cross-national comparisons employing ESS data (Staerklé, 
Svallfors and van Oorschot 2007).
I n d e p e n d e n t  i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  va r i a b l e s 
The key variable of our research interest, the perceived magnitude of unemployment,  was 
measured by the question: “Of every 100 people of working age in [country] how many would 
you say are unemployed and looking for work?”2 Originally, this question had 11 answer 
categories: 1 – “0-4,” 2 – “5-9,” 3 – “10-14,” 4 – “15-19,” 5 – “20-24,” 6 – “25-29,” 7 – “30-34,” 
8 – “35-39,” 9 – “40-44,” 10 – “45-49,” and 11 – “50 or more.” After inspecting missing data 
within and across countries, this variable was recoded into five categories: 1 (rather small): 
0-9, 2 (medium): 10-19, 3 (large): 20-39, 4 (very large): 40 or more, and 5 (item non-response).3 
We use this recoded variable in a multilevel analysis as a group of dummy variables (so as to 
be able to keep in item non-response).
A set of indicators was used to measure theoretical concepts presented in the literature 
review. 1) The main source of income in the household was used to identify resource 
competitors. 2) Data regarding gender, age groups, highest level of education, ethnic 
2  A drawback of this variable is that it cannot be known which population the respondents consider when they 
answer this question. That is, people might be better aware of the unemployment situation in their surroundings 
(e.g. family, friends, community, region) rather than in the whole country, and thus every respondent might base 
their answer on different populations. Moreover, it cannot be known whether some of the respondents takes 
into account the inactive labor population (e.g. students, housewives) when they provide the relative numbers 
of unemployed job seekers. 
3  Note: the labels do not reflect any qualification of actual unemployment rates, since, for example, a real 
rate of 9% is not considered ‘rather small’ in any social debate.
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background, immigration status, perceived unemployment risk, employment status as indicated 
by main activity for the last seven days, and previous unemployment for longer than three 
months was used to identify (potential) beneficiaries. 3) Tax payers were identified by responses 
indicating an individual’s feelings about their current household income (subjective income).  4) 
Welfare producers were identified by their responses to questions regarding their employment 
sector. 5) Political orientation and ideology was measured by responses to two statements 
capturing egalitarian values: “large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly 
reward differences in talents and efforts,” and “for a society to be fair, differences in people’s 
standard of living should be small.” 6) Data reflecting personal trust in parliament, political 
parties and politicians was used to measure political trust.  7) Responses to “most unemployed 
people do not really try to find a job” and “what do you think overall about the standard of living 
of people who are unemployed?” provided a measure of attitudes towards the unemployed. 
Due to limited space, tables containing operationalisation and descriptive statistics of individual-
level variables were not included in this article but are available upon request. 
I n d e p e n d e n t  c o n t e x t u a l - l e v e l  va r i a b l e s 
At level-2, the main focus is on actual unemployment rates presented by Eurostat. A 
seasonally adjusted, harmonised unemployment rate (2008) and the long-term (unemployed 
for more than 12 months) unemployment rate for 2008 are used due to the argument that 
unemployment salience impacts attitudes about welfare for the jobless. Averages of five years 
are also introduced for seasonally adjusted, harmonised unemployment rates (2004-2008) and 
long-term unemployment rates (2004-2008). Averages might be a better measure than “one-
shot” indicators as they help to capture lagged effects, avoid possible short-term fluctuations, 
and better reflect persistent unemployment. In line with the theoretical section, 13 other 
characteristics are also used to present a country’s economic conditions (four variables) and 
social welfare systems (nine variables). Once again, due to space limitations, a table with 
operationalisation and descriptive statistics was not included but is available upon request. 
M i s s i n g  d a t a
Analysis showed that the variable representing the perceived magnitude of unemployment 
has 3,914 missing values overall (8.7%), of which 98.4% are “don’t know.” This could still be 
tolerable but Bulgaria (28%), Spain (23.9%), Portugal (29.5%), and Romania (30.9%) had too 
many missing values to be list-wise-deleted. Overall, there were four variables4 missing more 
than 5% of data when each country was analysed separately. Therefore, item non-response 
dummies5 were created for these variables. Only “don’t know” and “refusal” are included 
in the non-response item dummies, while system missing cases are removed from further 
4  Political orientation, perceived unemployment risk, and the main source of household income.
5  Since the dominating missing value type is “don’t know” and the key questions are basically related to at-
titudes and perceptions, multiple imputation would not be valid: by imputing, those people who do not have an 
opinion would be forced to become opinionated. Furthermore, it would artificially assume that their attitudes 
towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed are affected by individual factors, which those people 
do not actually contemplate.
36  Greta Mackonytė, Catalina Lomos and Wim van Oorschot
analysis. The latter were obtained due to technical surveying reasons rather than surveyed 
people, and they are minor (less than 1% in all variables). Patterns of system missing data 
were also investigated, but none were identified. Finally, the remaining missing level-1 data 
that were not discussed here were list-wise-deleted.
2 . 3 .  S t a t i s t i ca l  a p p r o a c h
S e l e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  c o n t r o l  va r i a b l e s
This research aims to investigate whether the perceived magnitude of unemployment 
makes an “independent” contribution to the formation of public attitudes, or whether this 
contribution fades away once other relevant characteristics are introduced. As mentioned 
before, such analysis makes sense only if we account for those characteristics that possibly 
affect a variation of both people’s perceptions of the magnitude of unemployment and their 
opinions about governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. In other words, we seek to 
introduce only those variables that are potential confounding factors of both aforementioned 
key variables, revealing that the relationship we are interested in was (partially) spurious. We 
do not seek to explain as much variation as possible in our dependent variable; this has been 
done in previous research. Rather, we opt for a more parsimonious model by focusing entirely 
on the relationship between perceptions of the unemployment magnitude and attitudes 
towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed. 
Therefore, the first step will be to see whether those variables affecting people’s attitudes 
towards government responsibilities to the unemployed that we identified in the literature 
are also related to the perceived magnitude of unemployment. This is done by running 
bivariate analyses. When both independent and dependent variables are continuous, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is employed; when the independent variable is categorical, Eta 
is used to measure association (IBM 2011). A “threshold” rule is applied and in the following 
multilevel analysis, the only independent variables retained are those that: 1) are statistically 
significantly associated with the perceived magnitude of unemployment at p<.05 level, and 
2) demonstrate association strength not lower than ±0.1, meaning that there is at least a small 
effect (Field 2009). Based on the results of bivariate analyses, the following variables are not 
used in multilevel analyses: age, ethnic minority background, immigration status, employment 
sector, and a belief that large differences in income are acceptable. In the meantime, the 
following variables are introduced into the multilevel analyses as potential confounding 
factors of both attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed (the 
dependent variable), and the perceived magnitude of unemployment (the independent 
variable): the main source of household income, gender, highest level of education, perceived 
unemployment risk, employment status, previously unemployment lasting longer than three 
months, subjective income, political orientation, a belief that a fair society requires small 
differences in standards of living, political trust, perceived living standards of the unemployed, 
and a belief that most unemployed people do not really try to find a job. 
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M u l t i l e v e l  a n a l y s i s
Since the study focused on individual and contextual characteristics, a multilevel analysis 
is applied where individuals are nested within countries (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In 
total, 41,146 individuals from 23 European countries are analysed. The intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) is calculated to obtain the proportion of the total variance of the dependent 
variable accounted for by contextual characteristics (Snijders and Bosker 2012). Raw 
b-coefficients are used, and all continuous and ordinal variables are grand-mean centred. 
An explanatory analysis begins by discussing six models containing only individual-level 
variables. Models are built addressing theoretical concepts presented in the literature review. 
Then we proceed with models containing both individual and country-level characteristics. A 
drawback of multilevel analysis, when it is used in cross-country studies, is that only a limited 
number of level-2 cases can be entered simultaneously (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2013). 
As a rule of thumb, for each ten units, only one variable should be introduced (Field 2009). 
Thus, having 23 countries allows for only two simultaneous contextual variables. Overall, the 
study proceeds with separate analyses containing all chosen individual-level variables and 
only one contextual variable (first step). As a second step, multivariate analyses containing 
two contextual variables and all chosen individual characteristics are run concurrently, i.e. 
combining those contextual variables that demonstrated significant effects in bivariate 
analyses performed in the first step.6  
We i g h t i n g
Design weight (dweight) is applied at level-1 analyses to correct for over- and under-
representation of people present due to limitations of the sample design (not all individuals 
from the population were given equal chances to participate in survey). Population weight 
(pweight) is applied to compensate for different population sizes when any pan-European 
statistics are calculated. However, pweight is not applied in a multilevel analysis, because 
multilevel models account for individual clustering in higher country units.  If pweight were 
used for weighting, this would result in an artificial modification of country characteristics 
without a theoretical basis (e.g. amplifying unemployment rate in Germany and reducing it in 
Slovakia), which would affect the results. Contextual effects should be equally valuable in each 
country regardless of population size. 
3. RESULTS
3 . 1 .  D e s c r i p t i v e  a n a l y s e s
We start by presenting some descriptive findings that set the scene for multilevel analysis. 
These general interest points contribute to a better understanding of and a more complete 
picture of the research context, the foundation on which we built our main research question.
An analysis of aggregated country-means shows that overall, attitudes towards 
governmental provisions for the unemployed are rather positive: the pan-European mean 
across countries is 6.92 on a 0-10 scale. Moreover, the variation of country-means is rather 
6  In total, there will be two such models (Model 7 and Model 8).
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moderate: they range from 5.92 in Slovakia to 8.52 in Latvia (Figure 1, horizontal axis). It 
implies that people living in different European countries are rather pro-statist regarding this 
issue. 
Concerning the perceived magnitude of unemployment, if the aggregated country-means 
are considered (Figure 1, vertical axis), rather large attitudinal variation can be found. They 
range from 2.76 in Switzerland to 7.44 in Hungary, on a 1-11 scale. The pan-European mean 
across countries is 4.96. Moreover, there are certain patterns. Mostly, perceptions of the 
unemployment magnitude are highest in the eastern (Hungary, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania) 
and southern (Portugal, Spain, Greece) European countries. However, perceptions of the 
unemployment magnitude were also quite high in Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the 
United Kingdom) and Belgium. Almost unanimously, the lowest perceptions are in the Nordic 
countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden), the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
The only “exceptional island” in this group is the Czech Republic, where perceptions of the 
unemployment magnitude are low. 
FIGURE 1. Relationship between attitudes towards governments’ responsibilities  
to the unemployed and the perceived magnitude of unemployment
Note: country-specific attitudes towards governments’ responsibilities to the unemployed (0-10 
points scale) and the perceived magnitude of unemployment (original 1-11 point scale) were 
weighted by dweight and were aggregated. The axes were re-centred so that a crossing would re-
present the cross-country means of both variables and weighted by dweight and pweight. Source: 
own calculations based on ESS 2008. 
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Another, perhaps more intuitive, way of reporting the perceived magnitude of 
unemployment is based on the categories mentioned in the questionnaire. Such figures show 
that 19.5% of Europeans believe the unemployment rate is 0-9%, while almost 30% perceive it 
to be 10-19%. Respectively, 28.4% and 14.7% of Europeans think that the unemployment rate 
is 20-39% or even above 40%. A wide range of these perceptions was also observed within 
countries (Annex Table 1).
As for the relationship between the perceived magnitude of unemployment and attitudes 
towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed, Figure 1 suggests a positive 
relationship at the aggregate level (r=0.35). A positive association implies that in countries 
where the magnitude of unemployment is perceived as larger, public support for welfare 
provisions for the unemployed is stronger. This relationship holds especially true in the 
eastern and southern European countries group. However, this is a preliminary finding as 
this relationship is yet to be tested amongst individuals and thus poses a possible ecological 
fallacy. 
Finally, analysis showed that for Europe as a whole there is a clear mismatch between 
the average perceived unemployment rate7 and the actual average unemployment rate: 
21.8%8 versus 6.3%, respectively. Clearly, people believe that unemployment is much higher 
than it is reported in the official statistics (Eurostat). This mismatch is also present in each 
individual country (Annex Figure 2). Moreover, at the aggregate level, perceived and actual 
unemployment rates are not perfectly correlated (r=0.59), suggesting that their variations are 
not the same and that these two variables are not proxies of each other. 
3 . 2 .  E x p l a n a t o r y  a n a l y s e s
I n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  a n a l y s i s
An “empty model” (Table 1: Model 0) is run first. It shows that around 11% of the total variance 
in the attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed can be explained by 
country-level characteristics. Although differences between individuals within a country are 
obviously more important, this variation at the country level is too notable to be ignored. This 
conclusion provides grounds for using a multilevel model. 
Six models containing only the selected individual-level characteristics9 follow the 
multilevel analysis. Model 1 shows that those who perceive the magnitude of unemployment 
7  In this particular case, we use the perceived unemployment rate as a synonym for the perceived magnitude 
of unemployment. 
8  For a more intuitive comparison with an actual unemployment rate, we calculated approximate perceived 
unemployment rates from 11 original categories. For this purpose, we took “middle points” from each answer 
category, assigned these points to the individual respondents and then aggregated at the country level. For 
example, for those respondents who originally chose “20-24% unemployed and looking for work,” we took a 
“middle point” of 22. The only exception made was for the last original category (“50% or more unemployed and 
looking for work”): for all individuals who chose this category, we assigned a “left-point” of 50. As this category 
is much broader than the other ten, we decided not to choose a “middle-point” (the perceived unemployment 
rate of 75% seems less plausible than the one of 50%). 
9  Analyses do not include those individual-level variables that are not sufficiently statistically related to the 
perceived unemployment magnitude. 
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as medium, large or very large are more positive in their attitudes towards welfare for the 
unemployed than those with rather low perceptions of the unemployment magnitude. On 
average, people with medium perceptions are more supportive by 0.07 points (p<.05), people 
with high perceptions – by 0.26 points (p<.001), and those with very high perceptions by 0.64 
points (p<.001) on a 10 point scale, when compared to those with rather low perceptions. This 
finding supports an expectation for a positive relationship. However, the contribution of this 
variable to the explained variance of attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the 
unemployed is rather modest: at the individual-level, it explains around 1%. 
After introducing a group of self-interest related variables (Models 2-4), the average 
positive relationship between the perceived unemployment magnitude and attitudes towards 
the government’s provisions for the unemployed decreases (which suggests that the initially 
found key relationship was partially spurious, but remains statistically significant). Of all the 
self-interest perspectives, the (potential) beneficiary indicators named in Model 3 are the 
ones mostly responsible for this partial spuriousness. When analysed in more detail, the 
coefficients of the perceived magnitude of unemployment were found to decrease mostly 
after introducing the perceived unemployment risk, suggesting that this variable is indeed 
an important confounding factor in our analysis. Additionally, in relation to variance at the 
individual-level, the resource competitor indicators (Model 2) explain a higher share of the 
variance (0.9%) when compared to (potential) beneficiary (0.67%) (Model 3) and tax payer 
indicators (0.44%) (Model 4).
When individual values and beliefs are introduced (Models 5-6), the average relationship 
between the perceived unemployment magnitude and attitudes towards the government’s 
provisions for the unemployed remains positive and statistically significant. On average, 
individuals with high and very high perceptions of the magnitude of unemployment are more 
supportive by 0.18 points (p<.001) and 0.45 points (p<.001) respectively, when compared 
to those with rather low perceptions (Model 6). Finally, values and beliefs are the biggest 
contributors to an explanation of individual-level variation in attitudes towards governmental 
responsibilities to the unemployed. Models 5 and 6 explain more than 8% of this variance, of 
which 3.35% is attributable to political ideology and trust, and 4.69% to attitudes towards the 
unemployed. 
The final remark is related to explained variance at country-level: just by introducing 
individual-level characteristics, around 43% of the country-level variance is explained. This 
means that nearly half of the 11% variation at the country level is due to differences in the 
composition of countries’ populations, and is not related to other contextual characteristics.
To summarise the main findings thus far, the models presented show that after controlling 
for all relevant confounding individual characteristics, on average, people are more supportive 
of the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed when they perceive the unemployment 
magnitude to be larger.10 As the main focus of this study is not to explain the effects of other 
10  Interestingly, those people who opted for “don’t know” while answering a question about the unemployment 
magnitude, are somewhat similar in their support levels to those with very high perceptions of the unemployment 
magnitude. This finding illustrates that “don’t knows” is a meaningful group that should not be simply ignored 
in the research. 
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individual characteristics, they are not discussed separately, but it should be noted that the 
significant effects found at the individual level are in line with the literature review.
C o n t e x t - l e v e l  a n a l y s i s
As the next step, various measures of actual unemployment rates are separately included in 
Model 6. Only long-term unemployment rates (2008) and average long-term unemployment 
rates (2005-2008) have statistically significant negative effects on attitudes towards the 
government’s responsibilities to the unemployed: when the rates increase by one percentage 
point, the mentioned attitudes decrease by 0.19 (p<.05) and 0.12 (p<.05) points, respectively. 
Then, continuing with measures of other economic conditions, only real GDP growth rate (2008) 
has a significant negative effect: on average, people living in countries with better current 
economic performance, have more negative attitudes towards governmental responsibilities 
to the unemployed (b=-0.08, p<.10). Regarding contextual variables representing the social 
welfare systems of the countries, no significant effects (p>.10) are found. 
TABLE 2. Multilevel analysis containing long-term unemployment rates and real GDP growth rate 
(controlled for all individual-level variables from Model 6)
Model 7:
Multivariate analysis
Model 8:
Multivariate analysis
FIXED PARAMETERS (b-coefficients)
Long-term unemployment rate, 2008 -0.15o(0.08)
Average long-term unemployment rate, 2004-2008 -0.10 (0.06)
Real GDP growth rate (percentage change on previous year) -0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04)
RANDOM PARAMETERS (variance components)
τ00(country level variance) 0.23***(0.07) 0.23***(0.07)
R2 (country level), cumulative %a 57.85 57.85
R2 difference (%, compared to Model6) 14.66 14.66
MODEL SUMMARY
Deviance difference (compared to Model6)b 7.00*** 6.00***
N (level-1) 41146 41146
N (level-2) 23 23
O P <.10, * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001. A CALCULATIONS BASED ON HOX (2010), P. 71.B Statisti-
cal significance was calculated based on Bosker and Snijders (2012), p. 97. Note: entries represent 
coefficients obtained from two separate multilevel models. In both models, the real GDP growth 
rate is first entered concurrently with the long-term unemployment rate (Model 7) and later with 
the average long-term unemployment rate (Model 8). In both Model 7 and Model 8, individual 
characteristics are kept constant (taken from Model 6). Numbers in parentheses represent stan-
dard errors. Estimation method: Restricted Maximum Likelihood (RML). Weighted by dweight.
Finally, we combine two contextual variables that demonstrated significant effects in “one-
by-one” analyses above (Table 2). Namely, the effect of the long-term unemployment rate 
(Model 7) and average long-term unemployment rate (Model 8) are analysed respectively, 
when controlled for real GDP growth rate in both models. The initially found negative effect 
of the long-term unemployment rate becomes weaker but remains significant (b=-0.15, 
p<.10), while the effect of the real GDP growth rate disappears, suggesting the latter was 
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spurious. Moreover, Model 7 explains around 15% of variation at level-2. Model 8 shows that 
when combined, both the real GDP growth rate and the average long-term unemployment 
rate (2005-2008) do not retain significant effects. It should be noted that coefficients of the 
perceived magnitude of unemployment that were obtained in Model 6, remain unchanged 
in both Model 7 and Model 8. Therefore, in Table 2, we report only those results relevant to 
contextual level findings. 
By completing the multilevel analyses, we fully answer the key research question: on 
average, people are more supportive of the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed 
when they perceive larger magnitude of unemployment. This positive relationship remains 
statistically significant after controlling for potential confounding factors at the individual and 
contextual levels. 
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, a relationship between the perceived magnitude of unemployment and attitudes 
towards the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed was investigated for the first 
time. Descriptive analyses suggest that European welfare states have rather high legitimacy in 
their support for the unemployed, as overall attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to 
the unemployed are positive. However, there is considerable variation in people’s perceptions 
of the magnitude of unemployment across and within countries. Furthermore, in all of the 
analysed countries, people perceive the unemployment rate to be higher than it really is. 
Explanatory analysis suggests that, on average, the larger the perceived magnitude of 
unemployment, the more positive public attitudes towards governmental responsibilities 
to the unemployed are, even after controlling for selected individual and country level 
characteristics. Recalling two competing explanations provided in section 1.1 of this article, 
it seems that people’s attitudes towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed 
are influenced more by feelings of empathy and solidarity (positive relation) than by negative 
opinions stimulated by associating unemployment with a burden (negative relation). 
Contextual level analysis also reveals some insights. On average, in countries with a higher 
long-term unemployment rate, people have more negative attitudes towards governmental 
provisions for the unemployed. This finding is particularly interesting if it is compared with 
the contribution of the perceived magnitude of unemployment. To recap, on average, those 
people who perceive the magnitude of unemployment as large or very large are more 
supportive of the government’s responsibilities to the unemployed. These findings stimulate 
thoughts on the mechanisms by which actual unemployment rates affect people’s attitudes 
towards welfare provisions to the unemployed, as well as on the mechanisms by which 
people filter actual unemployment situations via their personal reality prisms. For now, it is 
clear that people do not “objectively” perceive actual unemployment rates; there are pipe-
mechanisms via which people arrive at their final judgments. This is in line with Kunovich 
(2013), who proposes to “directly examine the mechanisms linking macro-level conditions to 
individual-level attitudes and behaviour.” The actual unemployment rate and the perceived 
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unemployment rate seem to be connected by a complicated “chain” of intermediaries such as 
media and other “epistemological devices” (McLeod et al. 1995).
Overall, the research suggests that public perceptions of the unemployment magnitude 
are a dark horse as they prove to influence people’s attitudes towards governmental 
responsibilities to the unemployed. Moreover, this research stimulates some further 
thoughts: first, in principle, people’s perceptions could be socially constructed; and second, 
that it is interesting to know how they are constructed, e.g. via such “reality filters” as 
personal observation, communication with others, media (Saunders 2002), policy actors, and 
stakeholders, etc. 
It is also important to address the limitations of this research. In this multilevel analysis, 
it was necessary to put constraints on the number of covariates entered at level-2. This 
constraint did not allow us to control for all of the possible relevant contextual determinants. 
A potential endogeneity problem should also be addressed. It is probable that public attitudes 
towards governmental responsibilities to the unemployed also influence the perceived 
magnitude of unemployment. If this were true, then the analysis would lack order validity. 
One would need rather longstanding, and currently unavailable, time series data to verify this. 
This issue of potential endogeneity is particularly common in research on welfare attitudes, 
which is strongly driven by analysing the interplay between people’s subjective perceptions 
and various attitudes. 
In the future, it would be necessary to investigate in more detail which individual 
characteristics and contextual factors trigger stronger perceptions of the unemployment 
rate (to reveal mechanisms). Moreover, the causes of a discrepancy between actual 
unemployment rate and the perceived unemployment rate could be analysed. Besides 
individual characteristics, the possible contextual effects of mass media communication 
(possible interactions) could also be taken into account. According to Price (1988, pp.664-665), 
“news reporting, political advertisement, opinion polling, public demonstration, and protest 
allow coordinated mass attention, thought, and expression across a large and heterogeneous 
group to be brought to bear upon a shared problem or issue.” Finally, the use of regional 
data, when available, could capture potentially different contextual effects across regions, as 
the unemployment rate may differ substantially between country regions. Moreover, from a 
multilevel analysis perspective, regional analysis would result in higher statistical power due 
to a higher number of units at this level. 
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ANNEXES
ANNEX TABLE 1. Percentage distribution of the perceived magnitude of unemployment within and 
across countries 
Rather small  
(0-9)
Medium (10-
19)
Large
 (20-39)
Very large (40+)
Item non-
response
BEa 13.3% 30.9% 36.2% 16.7% 3.0%
BGa 6.7% 19.8% 29.7% 22.8% 21.0%
CHa 58.4% 21.1% 12.1% 3.1% 5.3%
CZa 36.3% 36.9% 14.1% 4.2% 8.5%
DEa 25.0% 35.2% 24.2% 12.9% 2.7%
DKa 52.4% 21.5% 13.3% 7.0% 5.7%
EEa 16.6% 31.5% 26.8% 13.9% 11.1%
ESa 8.4% 26.4% 27.2% 18.8% 19.2%
FIa 38.1% 34.2% 19.1% 3.5% 5.1%
FRa 17.4% 32.8% 34.9% 11.9% 3.1%
GBa 18.4% 27.0% 33.5% 17.6% 3.4%
GRa 8.3% 30.0% 38.6% 18.7% 4.4%
HUa 4.4% 15.8% 33.8% 41.1% 5.0%
IEa 4.8% 25.1% 39.1% 29.1% 2.0%
LVa 3.1% 19.8% 39.9% 28.1% 9.1%
NLa 33.5% 32.6% 22.2% 7.9% 3.9%
NOa 55.2% 24.0% 15.3% 3.7% 1.8%
PLa 17.3% 32.4% 29.1% 10.7% 10.5%
PTa 8.5% 19.4% 25.4% 23.6% 23.2%
ROa 12.6% 19.3% 26.5% 18.7% 22.9%
SEa 43.2% 29.2% 20.4% 5.6% 1.6%
SIa 16.1% 29.5% 29.0% 14.7% 10.8%
SKa 20.6% 35.0% 24.1% 12.7% 7.6%
Pan-European 
distributionb
19.5% 29.6% 28.4% 14.7% 7.8%
a cases were weighted by dweight. b cases were weighted by dweight and pweight. 
Source: compiled by the authors based on ESS 2008. 
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ANNEX FIGURE 2. Perceived and actual unemployment rates (%) 
Note: the perceived unemployment rate was converted from 1-11 point scale into approximate 
percentage points. Source: own calculations from ESS 2008 and the Eurostat. 
